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Legal Ethics
by J. Randolph Evans*
and
Anthony W. Morris*
In 1989, the Supreme Court of Georgia and the State Bar of Georgia
embarked upon what they considered a long-range project-to raise the
level of professionalism of lawyers in the state. Accordingly, the Georgia
Supreme Court established the Chief Justice's Commission on Professionalism, the first such body of its kind in the entire nation. Its
primary mission is to ensure that the practice of law is engaged in the
service not only of the client, but also of the public at large.'
During the past year,2 the Georgia appellate courts have focused their
attention on professionalism. The courts issued significant decisions
regarding the appropriate standard of care, including the role legal
ethics will play in establishing the standard of care in legal malpractice
cases. Also, the courts have analyzed the ethical propriety of certain
types of fee arrangements with clients and others, including the validity
of liquidated damages clauses in retainer agreements and the propriety
of splitting fees with referral services. In addition, the courts have
opened the door for broader solicitation of clients by attorneys and issued
guidelines for attorneys who wish to contact former employees of
organizations that are opposing parties in litigation. Finally, the courts
have further defined statute of limitations issues in malpractice actions.

* Partner in the firm of Arnall Golden & Gregory, Atlanta, Georgia. Chairman of the
Professional Liability Department; Noted lecturer in the subject of legal malpractice and
professional ethics; Author of The PracticalGuide to Legal MalpracticePrevention (3d ed.
1995). West Georgia College (B.S., 1980); University of Georgia (J.D., 1983).
** Associate in the firm of Arnall Golden & Gregory, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.B.A., 1987); Emory University (M.B.A., 1989); Georgia State University (J.D.,
1992).
1. STATE BAR OF GEORGIA HANDBOOK 108 (1994-1995) (hereinafter HANDBOOK].
2. The surveyed period of this article is June 1, 1994 through May 31, 1995. When
used in this article, "the past year" refers to the surveyed period.
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1. THE INCREASING ROLE OF ETHICS IN LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASES
During the past year, the appellate courts have altered the legal role
that ethical standards play in the legal profession in Georgia. The courts
have long felt that the professional nature of the practice of law and its
obligations to the public interest require that lawyers be civilly
responsible for their professional acts.' In First Bank & Trust Co. v.
Zagoria,4 the Georgia Supreme Court held that an attorney who is a
shareholder in a professional corporation engaged in the practice of law
is liable for the professional misdeeds of the other members of his firm
when he holds himself out as a member of the law firm. In Zagoria an
attorney who was a member of a professional corporation issued checks
to clients in connection with real estate and other loan closings; the
checks were dishonored because withdrawals from the law firm's
checking account on which they were drawn left insufficient funds in the
account.5 The court found that another attorney, who was also a
shareholder in the professional corporation, but who was not personally
involved in the loan closings or account withdrawals, was personally
liable for the dishonored checks.' In so ruling, the court focused on the
is inapproprofessional nature of the practice of law and stated that 'it
priate for a lawyer to be able to play hide-and-seek in the shadows and
folds of the corporate veil and thus escape the responsibilities of
professionalism."'
In Evanoff v. Evanoff,8 the Georgia Supreme Court again addressed
the professionalism issue.9 In that case, the court dismissed an appeal
of a final judgment in a divorce action. In the trial court, the husband
filed a petition for divorce. Although the wife's attorney filed a notice of
appearance, he did not file a timely answer. The attorneys for both sides
held several conversations toward negotiating a settlement, and the
wife's attorney sent the opposing counsel a letter confirming the
anticipated resolution. However, notwithstanding the discussions and
prior to the date that the court had set for a final hearing, the husband's
attorney proceeded ex parte before the presiding judge and presented
evidence for a final decree, which the court granted.1"

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
250 Ga. 844, 302 S.E.2d 674 (1983).
Id. at 845, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
Id.
Id. at 846, 302 S.E.2d at 675.
262 Ga. 303, 418 S.E.2d 62 (1992).

9. Id. at 303, 418 S.E.2d at 62.
10. Id.
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The trial court subsequently denied a motion to vacate the decree by
the wife's attorney." The Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the trial
court that the case did not fall within the precise bounds of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 9-11-60(d) 2 because the
husband's attorney took no action that could be characterized as actual
fraud." However, concerned with the professionalism of the husband's
attorney, or lack thereof, Justice Benham issued a concurring opinion
dealing with professionalism.14
Justice Benham opined that the husband's attorney's actions in
proceeding to the final decree "exceeded the bounds of professionalism
Specifically, Justice
and ethical conduct governing attorneys.""5
Benham noted Ethical Consideration 7-10,'6 which recognizes a
concurrent obligation of an attorney to treat with consideration all
persons involved in a legal process and to avoid the infliction of needless
harm; Ethical Consideration 7-38,7 states that a lawyer should be
courteous to opposing counsel and should follow local customs of courtesy
or practice, unless timely notice to the contrary is given to opposing
counsel; Directory Rule 7-106(c)(6), s states that a lawyer shall not
engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a
tribunal. 9 Although the conduct was deemed by Justice Benham to be
unprofessional and unethical, it did not, according to the court, violate
Therefore, the Georgia Supreme Court
any legal requirement."
vacated the grant of application for discretionary appeal.21

ii. Id.
12. OC.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) (1993) provides that a judgment may be set aside for
"fraud, accident, or mistake, or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence
or fault of the movant." Id.
13. 262 Ga. at 303, 418 S.E.2d at 62.
14. Id. (Benham, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 304, 418 S.E.2d at 62.
16. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 34-H. Ethical Consideration [(EC) 7-10] State Bar of
Georgia Rules and Regulations provides that "[tihe duty of a lawyer to represent his client
with zeal does not militate against his concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all
persons involved inthe legal process and to avoid infliction of needless harm." Id.
17. HANDBOOK,supra note 1, at 36-H. EC 7-38 states, in material part, that a "lawyer
should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable requests.., that
do not prejudice the rights of his client. He should follow local customs of courtesy or
practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of his intention not to do so.
... " Id.
18. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 37-H. State Bar of Georgia Rules and Regulations
Directory Rule ["DR"] 7-106(C)(6) provides, in part, that a lawyer shall not engage in
undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal.
19. 262 Ga. at 304 n.2, 418 S.E.2d at 62 n.2.
20. Id. at 304, 418 S.E.2d at 62.
21. 262 Ga. 303, 304, 418 S.E.2d 62, 62 (1992).
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The Georgia Supreme Court seemed to retreat from this position in
Green v. Green.22 In that case, the appellant filed a divorce action and
subsequently moved to Ohio. Her attorney then properly withdrew from
the case. Subsequently, the case appeared as the fifteenth case on a
trial calendar. The notice, published in the legal newspaper of the
county, specified that all but the first ten cases would be "on call."2"
The appellee's counsel did not attempt to give notice of the trial to the
24
appellant.
The appellee and his counsel appeared and answered
25
ready.
When the trial court indicated that it would continue the case because
it could not locate the file, appellee's counsel located the file in another
judge's office and presented it to the trial court. 2' The court then heard
the case and entered an order awarding appellee custody and child
support. Appellant moved to set aside the order, but the trial court
denied the motion. The Georgia Supreme
Court granted appellant's
27
application for discretionary review.
Initially, the court held that only the first ten cases on the published
calendar were required to be present under the rule in effect at the
time.2" Since judgment was entered against a party who was not
required by the rule to be present, the judgment should have been set
aside.29
The court then addressed the professionalism issue. Distinguishing
Evanoff, ° the court stated that in Green"' there was case law permit-

22. 263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457 (1993).
23. Id. at 551, 437 S.E.2d at 458.
24. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 457.
25. Id., 437 S.E.2d at 458.
26. Id. at 552, 437 S.E.2d at 458.
27. Id.
28. Id. In so ruling, the court relied on the holding in Fulton v. State of Georgia, 183
Ga. App. 570, 359 S.E.2d 726 (1987). There, the court of appeals held that only the first
five cases on the published calendar were required to be present. The rule was amended
in 1989 to raise the number of cases for which parties and counsel must be present from
five to ten. Uniform Superior Court Rule 8.4 provides that
parties and counsel in the first ten actions on the published trial calendar shall
appear ready for trial on the date specified unless otherwise directed by the
assigned judge. Parties in all other actions on the calendar are expected to be
ready for trial but may contact the calendar clerk to obtain: (A) A specific date and
time for trial during the trial term specified in the calendar; or'(B) Permission to
await the call by the calendar clerk of the action for trial upon reasonable notice
to counsel.
Unif. Super. Ct. R. 8.4 (1994).
29. 263 Ga. at 555, 437 S.E.2d at 460.
30. 262 Ga. 303, 418 S.E.2d 62 (1992).
31. 263 Ga. 551, 437 S.E.2d 457.
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ting the setting aside of the judgment as an exercise of discretion. 2
The court then noted, "[Tihere is the caution in Evanoff that the courts
will not condone a refusal 'to act out of a spirit of cooperation and civility
and not wholly out of a sense of blind and unbridled advocacy.' ' 3
The court summarized attorneys' professional duties as follows:
"

That spirit of cooperation and civility, when taken together with the
notions of fundamental fairness that lie at the heart of the principle of
due process of law, requires that attorneys, as officers of the court,
make a good faith effort to ensure that all parties to a controversy have
a full and fair opportunity to be heard. Such an effort may entail, as
is already the customary practice of many attorneys, counsel assuming
the burden of notifying by mail any unrepresented opposing party
when their case appears on a trial calendar.34
The court observed that appellee's counsel acted unprofessionally and
noted that professionalism encompasses not only those things an
attorney must do, but also those things an attorney ought to do. 3s
In a special concurring opinion, Justice Sears-Collins rejected an
absence of professionalism as a basis to set aside a judgment." Her
opinion stated as follows:
Moreover, the State Bar Rules provide that professionalism standards
are "non-mandatory" and "aspirational." State Bar Rule 9-101. That
being so, it can hardly be concluded that a litigant has notice that
non-mandatory and aspirational standards will be made mandatory
and used to set aside his or her judgment.37
Justice Sears-Collins reasoned that the majority's reliance on
professionalism to vacate a judgment infringes upon, if not violates, both
the appellee and the appellee's lawyer's rights to due process. 38
Interestingly, Justice Sears-Collins foresaw the future when she wrote:
[Tlhe majority has begun the descent of the slippery slope of legislating
civility and courtesy. In the future, this Court no doubt will have to
classify some professionalism standards as more important than others,

32. Id. at 552, 437 S.E.2d at 458. A trial court has the discretion to set aside a
judgment against a party who pleads lack of notice. Spyropoulos v. John Linard Estate,
243 Ga. 518, 255 S.E.2d 40 (1979).
33. 263 Ga. at 554, 437 S.E.2d at 459 (quoting Euanoff, 262 Ga. 304, 418 S.E.2d 62
(1992)).
34. Id. at 554-55, 437 S.E.2d at 459-60.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 556, 437 S.E.2d at 461 (Sears-Collins, J., concurring).
37. Id. at 557, 437 S.E.2d at 461.
38. Id. at 556-57, 437 S.E.2d at 461.
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some transgressions as more unprofessional than others, and some
standards as appropriate weapons in the litigation arena and others
only as guides for regulating conduct through our attorney disciplinary
agencies. These problems illustrate why this Court should not permit
its distaste for lawyers who may not be exercising common sense,
maturity, and civility to blind it to the problems of legislating such
conduct."2
Indeed, this appears to be exactly what has happened during the past
year. Over the years, courts in various jurisdictions have taken different
approaches regarding whether codes of ethics ofprofessional responsibility are admissible as evidence of a lawyer's standard of care. Some
courts have held that professional ethics standards conclusively establish
a duty of care, and violations of the standards constitute negligence per
se.4 ° A minority of courts have found that an ethical rules violation
establishes a rebuttable presumption of malpractice. 4 The majority of
states treat violations of ethical rules as admissible evidence of the
lawyer's duty of care.42
4
In Allen v. Letkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer,"
the Georgia Supreme Court decided to follow the rule of the majority of states and held
that the Georgia Code of Professional Responsibility" and pertinent bar
rules45 may be admissible as evidence of the standard of care in a legal
malpractice action.4 In Allen the plaintiff retained the law firm to
settle her late husband's estate.47 When she expressed a desire to sell
her late husband's business, the law firm introduced her to a buyer. The
attorneys represented both parties in the transaction, and they included
in the purchase contract an indemnification clause to protect the law

39. Id. at 558, 437 S.E.2d at 462.
40. In Avianca, Inc. v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666 (D.D.C. 1989), the court held that the
disciplinary rules define the minimum level of conduct, and a violation of the rules is
conclusive evidence of an attorney's breach of fiduciary duty.
41. In Beattie v. Firnschild, 394 N.W.2d 107 (Mich. App. 1986), the court ruled that a
code violation established a rebuttable presumption of malpractice.
42. Other courts have held that violations of the CODE oF PRoFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY may be introduced as evidence of legal malpractice. Woodruff v. Tomlin, 616 F.2d 924
(6th Cir. 1980); Lipton v. Boesky, 313 N.W.2d 163 (Mich. App. 1981); Martinson Bros. v.
Hjellum, 359 N.W.2d 865 (N.D. 1985); Albright v. Burns, 503 A.2d 386 (N.J. 1986);
Fishman v. Brooks, 487 N.E.2d 1377 (Mass. 1986); Williams v. Mordofsky, 901 F.2d 158
(D.C. Cir. 1990); Olson v. Fraase, 421 N.W.2d 820 (N.D. 1988).
43. 265 Ga. 374, 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995).
44. GEORGIA STATE BAR RULE 3-101.
45. GEORGIA STATE BAR RULE 4-102.
46. 265 Ga. at 376, 453 S.E.2d at 721.
47. Allen v. Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 212 Ga. App. 560,442 S.E.2d 466
(1994), rev'd, 265 Ga. 374, 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995).
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firm from liability. When the buyer defaulted on his obligation to pay
the plaintiff the amount due under the purchase agreement, and he
liquidated the company, the plaintiff sued the law firm to recover her
losses and punitive damages."
At trial, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence regarding the
attorneys' alleged violation of certain provisions of the Code of ProfesThe
sional Responsibility49 relating to multiple representations."
trial court excluded all references to the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.5 1 After the
trial court denied a motion for j.n.o.v. and a new trial, the plaintiff appealed.52
Citing Davis v. Findley,53 the court of appeals held that the Code of
Professional Responsibility does not establish civil liability for legal
malpractice and thus, the trial court properly excluded all references to
the Code of Professional Responsibility.54
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the Code of
Professional Responsibility and pertinent bar rules are relevant to the
The court reasoned
standard of care in a legal malpractice action.55
that the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Standards of
Conduct set forth a "general guide" for the conduct of lawyers.5 8
Therefore, according to the court, the Code and the Standards of Conduct
play a role in shaping the "care and skill" ordinarily exercised by
lawyers.57 However, the court refused to go as far as to say that all bar
rules are necessarily relevant in every legal malpractice action.55
Instead, the court articulated the following standard:
In order to relate to the standard of care in a particular case, we hold
that a Bar Rule must be intended to protect a person in the plaintiff's
position or be addressed to the particular harm suffered by the plaintiff
.... [Tihus, while a Bar Rule is not determinative of the standard of
care applicable in a legal malpractice action, it may be "a circumstance
9

that can be considered, along with other facts and circumstances."

48. Id.
49.

GEORGIA STATE BAR RULE 3-101.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

212 Ga, App. at 560, 442 S.E.2d at 467.
Id., 442 S.E.2d at 466.
Id.
262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
212 Ga. App. at 561, 442 S.E.2d at 467.
265 Ga. at 376, 453 S.E.2d at 721.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 377, 453 S.E.2d at 721.
Id., 453 S.E.2d at 722.
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As a result, in Georgia, an attorney's violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Standards of Conduct is now admissible as
evidence of the standard of care in a legal malpractice action against
that attorney when the bar rule was intended to protect a person in the
plaintiff's position
or was addressed to the particular harm suffered by
60
the plaintiff.
In a separate concurrence, Justice Benham raised several concerns,
including his concern that the holding will "create confusion, erode this
court's authority in regulating the practice of law, result in unwarranted
prejudice to legal malpractice defendants, foster an avalanche of
malpractice complaints, hamper efforts to improve ethical standards and
professionalism, and have far reaching adverse effects in other areas of
professional malpractice."61
The general rule that ethical violations, standing alone, cannot be the
basis for a malpractice claim remains the law.62 In Davis v.Findley,63
the Georgia Supreme Court held that, "while the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides specific sanctions for the professional misconduct
of attorneys whom it regulates, it does not establish civil liability of
attorneys for their professional misconduct, nor does it create remedies
in consequence thereof."6 4
II.

FAILURE OF THE ATTORNEY TO EXERCISE ORDINARY CARE, SKILL,
AND DILIGENCE

In Georgia, in order to recover against an attorney for professional
malpractice, the plaintiff must establish, among other things, a deviation
from the applicable standard of care.65 This is simply a corollary of the
traditional formula for the necessary elements to a cause of action in
tort: duty, breach (failure to conform to the required standard), and
damage proximately caused by the breach."6 In Kellos v. Sawilow-

60. Id., 453 S.E.2d at 721-22.
61.

Id. at 378, 453 S.E.2d at 722 (Benham, J., concurring).

62. Tante v. Herring, 211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993), aff'd in part, reu'din part,
264 Ga. 694, 453 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
63. 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
64. Id. at 613, 422 S.E.2d at 861.
65. Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 457, 330 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1985). The Court
held that, in a legal malpractice action, the client has the burden of establishing (1)
employment of the defendant attorney; (2) failure of the attorney to exercise ordinary care,
skill, and diligence; and (3) such negligence was the proximate cause of damage to the
plaintiff. Id.
66. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 30 (5th ed.
1984).
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sky," the Georgia Supreme Court articulated the standard of care
against which an attorney's conduct is to be measured in a legal
malpractice action in Georgia. The court held as follows:
Our Courts have held that an attorney's duty is "to use such skill,
prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity
commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks which
they undertake" and that "[an attorney is not bound to extraordinary
diligence. He is bound to reasonable skill and diligence, and the skill

has reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do.
*.." [Tihus while the standardof care requiredof an attorney remains
constant, its application may vary.68

The court identified two considerations in particularizing the standard
of care in a given case: (1) the number of options available to the
attorney, and (2) the amount of time which the attorney has to consider
them.69
Quoting Hughes v. Malone,70 the court noted that the
"effectiveness of representation may also be judged by the familiarity of
counsel with the case, including counsel's opportunity to investigate and
diligence in doing so, in order meaningfully to advise the client of his
options."7
The court held that the standard of care required of an attorney
remains constant whether the attorney is considered a practitioner of a
given state or a practitioner of the legal profession generally.72 While
the standard remains the same, the application of the standard of care
may, according to the court, vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and
from situation to situation.73
In applying the standard of care in a particular situation, the court of
appeals provided the following guidance in Hughes v. Malone:
Although an attorney is not an insurer of the results sought to be

obtained by such representation, when, after undertaking to accomplish
a specific result, he then willfully or negligently fails to apply
commonly known and accepted legal principles and procedures through
ignorance of basic, well-established and unambiguous principles of law

or through a failure to act reasonably to protect his client's interests,
then he has breached his duty toward the client. As the legal
profession is at best an inexact science, a breach of duty arises only

67.
68.
69.
70.

254 Ga. 4, 325 S.E.2d 757 (1985).
Id. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758.
Id.
146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978).

71.

254 Ga. at 5, 325 S.E.2d at 758.

72. Id.
73. Id.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol, 47

when the relevant, i.e., legal principles or procedures are well settled
and their application clearly demanded, and the failure to apply them
apparent; otherwise, an attorney acting in good faith and to the best
74
of his knowledge will be insulated from liability for adverse results.
The standard of conduct as applied in the legal malpractice context
should not be confused with the fiduciary duties arising out of the
7 5 the attorney
attorney-client relationship.
In Tante v. Herring,
successfully prosecuted a claim for social security disability benefits on
behalf of his client.7' Notwithstanding a successful monetary result,
the court of appeals, nonetheless, held that the attorney committed legal
malpractice when he induced and engaged in sexual intercourse with his
client to his client's detriment.77 The court of appeals specifically held
that a "successful monetary result on a claim does not mean that a
lawyer cannot, per se, otherwise breach his professional responsibilities
7
to his client." 1
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the holding as it
related to legal malpractice. 79 The court found that there was no
evidence that the attorney's conduct had any effect on this performance
of legal services under his agreement with her."0 Indeed, the attorney
obtained for the wife "precisely the results for which he was retained,
the recovery of social security disability benefits.""1 Under the court's
reasoning, the element of breach of duty in a legal malpractice case-the
failure to exercise ordinary care, skill, and diligence-must relate
directly to the duty of the attorney, that is, the duty to perform the task
for which the attorney was hired. 2 The Georgia Supreme Court held
that contrary to the holding of the court of appeals, a satisfactory result
under an agreement for legal services, by necessity, precludes a claim for
legal malpractice."

74.
75.

S.E.2d
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

146 Ga. App. at 344-45, 247 S.E.2d at 111.
211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993), affid in part, rev'd in part, 264 Ga. 694, 453

686 (1994).
211 Ga. App. at 322, 439 S.E.2d at 5.
Id. at 324, 439 S.E.2d at 8.
Id.
Tante v. Herring, 264 Ga. 694, 695, 453 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1993).
Id. The Georgia Supreme Court held that Tante violated Standard 28 by engaging

in a sexual relationship with his mentally and emotionally impaired client, that he used
her secrets to her disadvantage, and that he used the client's psychological evaluations to
encourage a sexual relationship for his own satisfaction. As a result, the court suspended
Tante from the practice of law for 18 months. Id. at 696, 453 S.E.2d at 688.
81. Id. at 695, 453 S.E.2d at 687.
82. Id.
83.

Id.

Likewise, the court held that there was no basis for the Herrings' breach of

contract claim. The court did, however, affirm the denial of summary judgment to Tante,
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However, in dicta, the court carved out an exception to its general rule
that satisfactory results bar a malpractice claim when it recognized that
"[it is conceivable that Tante's improper conduct might have affected his
performance of legal services in another context, e.g., had he been
retained to represent Mrs. Herring in a divorce or child custody
action." s' Thus, in most situations, if an attorney achieves satisfactory
results in representing a client that client may not, in turn, state a claim
for legal malpractice."5
In order to recover in a legal malpractice claim, a plaintiff must
establish a deviation from the relevant standard of care. 6 During the
past year, the Georgia Court of Appeals focused on professional services
rendered when the law is not settled. Relying on the standard
articulated in Hughes, 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Jones,
Day, Reavis & Pogue v.American Envirecycle, Inc.," that a law firm
defendant was insulated from liability arising from a claim of negligent
drafting of a sales contract when there were unsettled issues of law
involved. 9 The predecessor of the law firm drafted a contract for its
client's purchase of real property from a local county development
authority in order to construct a biomedical and industrial waste
incineration facility. The authority subsequently pulled out of the deal
and sued the client claiming fraud in the inducement and ultra vires. 90
The trial court struck down the contract because it lacked a required
provision stating the client's intended use of the property.9' The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, and the client filed suit
against the law firm for malpractice.92
In the appeal of the denial of summary judgment for the law firm in
the malpractice action, the court of appeals found that the law regarding
the requirement of including a statement of purpose within the body of
a contract for sale of land by a development authority was not clearly
settled at the time the contract was drafted.93 Therefore, relying on the

holding that the Herrings had a claim for damages arising from a breach of Tante's
fiduciary duty in his attorney-client relationship with Mrs. Herring. Id. at 696,453 S.E.2d
at 688.
84. Id. at 695 n.1, 453 S.E.2d at 687 n.l.
85. Id. at 695, 453 S.E,2d at 687.
86. Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 330 S.E.2d 392 (1985).
87. 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978).
88. 217 Ga. App. 80, 456 S.E.2d 264 (1995).
89. Id. at 80, 456 S.E.2d at 264.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 84, 456 S.E.2d at 267.
Id. at 80, 456 S.E.2d at 264.
Id. at 84, 456 S.E.2d at 267.
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standard of care established in Hughes" and Berman v. Rubin, 5 the
law firm could not be held responsible for failing to include a statement
of intent in the contract." Reversing the trial court, the court of
appeals ruled that the law firm was insulated from liability and entitled
to summary judgment. 7
III.

THE ROLE OF ETHICS IN OTHER CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST
ATTORNEYS

Legal ethics may also play a role in causes of action against attorneys
other than legal malpractice. If an attorney assumes an interest
antagonistic to that of the client, the attorney may be liable for breach
5 the client and her husband
of fiduciary duty. In Tante v. Herring,"
sued their former attorney for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, and breach of contract, claiming that the attorney, after reviewing
the client's psychological evaluations, took advantage of the client's
impaired judgment and difficulty with interpersonal relationships by
initiating and maintaining a two-year sexual relationship through which
she contracted a venereal disease. The court of appeals agreed with the
trial court's finding that the attorney breached his fiduciary duty to his
client.99
Citing O.C.G.A. section 23-2-58100 and Jerry Lipps, Inc. v. Pos-

94. 146 Ga. App. 341, 247 S.E.2d 107 (1978).
95. 138 Ga. App. 849, 853, 227 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1976). "[Unless the law is so well
settled, clear, and widely recognized, an attorney acting in good faith and to the best of his
knowledge will be insulated from liability for adverse results," Id.
96. 217 Ga. App. at 84, 456 S.E.2d at 267.
97. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 267-68.
98. 211 Ga. App. 322, 439 S.E.2d 5 (1993), a/'d in part,reu'd in part, 264 Ga. 694,439
S.E.2d 5 (1994).
99. 211 Ga. App. at 325, 439 S.E.2d at 9. In contrast, in Suppressed v. Suppressed,
565 N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 571 N.E.2d 156 (11. 1991), the Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of a former client's breach of fiduciary
duty claim against her former attorney. The plaintiff alleged that while representing her
in a divorce action the attorney seduced her into having sexual relations. The court
declined to extend the attorney's duty of good faith and fair dealing toward his client to
their personal relationship. Instead, so long as the attorney's behavior in their personal
relationship did not affect his professional services, there was no action for breach of
fiduciary duty. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged only intangible injury such as humiliation
and emotional distress, and. she did not allege any pecuniary harm in her divorce action.
In its ruling, the court noted deficiencies in the duty and damage elements of the plaintiffs
claim, but unlike the court in Tante, it did not address the breach or the standard of care.
100. O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1991). Confidential relations defined, provides as follows:
Any relationship shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature,
created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to
exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or
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tell,1"' the court of appeals in Authur v. Georgia Cotton Co. noted that
attorneys are obligated not to put themselves in a position where their
interests are antagonistic to those of their clients. 102 According to the
court, an attorney can pursue no interest or take any act adverse to the
client's interests or incompatible with applying the attorney's best skill,
zeal, and diligence in representing the client.1 3 Because of this
fiduciary relationship, an attorney has a duty to exercise the utmost
good faith and loyalty, and act solely for the client's benefit."° An
attorney occupies a position of trust and confidence, and is not allowed
to promote personal interests to the injury of clients. 05 An attorney
is not allowed to profit from the attorney-client relationship, or from the
sensitive knowledge obtained therein, to the injury of the client.0 6
The court of appeals in Tante held that the attorney used sensitive
information available to him solely because of his attorney-client
relationship to his personal advantage and to the client's disadvantage. 0 7 Moreover, the attorney engaged in an extramarital affair with
one client who was the wife of his other client in the same cause,
allegedly infecting the wife with a venereal disease. Thus, the court of
appeals held that the attorney assumed an interest antagonistic to his
clients and their cause, and contrary to his role as their trusted
Therefore, the clients were entitled to recover for breach
attorney.'
of fiduciary relationship."°
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment
as to liability for breach of fiduciary duty."0 The court found that the
evidence indicated the lawyer had misused confidential information
regarding the wife's impaired emotional and mental condition to
convince her to have an affair with him."' The court found that, by
using confidential information to his own advantage, and to the wife's

where, from a similar relationship or mutual confidence, the law requires the
utmost good faith, such as the relationship between partners, principal and agent,
etc.

Id.
101. 139 Ga.App. 595, 229 S.E.2d 78 (1976).
102. 22 Ga. App. 431, 96 S.E. 232 (1918).
103. Chester Realty Co. v. Stansell, 151 Ga. App. 357, 359, 259 S.E.2d 639, 641 (1979).
104. Dolvin Realty Co. v. Holey, 203 Ga. 618, 622, 48 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1948).
105. Morris v.Johnstone, 172 Ga. 598, 604, 158 S.E. 308, 312 (1931).
106. Koch v. Cochran, 251 Ga. 559, 560, 307 S.E.2d 918, 919 (1983).
107. 211 Ga. App. 322,439 S.E.2d 5 (1993), afftd in part,rev'd in part,264 Ga. 694,439
S.E.2d 5 (1994).
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. 264 Ga. 694, 695, 453 S.E.2d 686, 687 (1993).
111. Id. at 696, 453 S.E.2d at 688.
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the lawyer had breached his fiduciary duty to the
disadvantage,
112
clients.

Interestingly, especially in light of the Georgia Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in Allen,"' the court may have given an indication
of things to come. The basis for the court's decision that Tante had
breached his fiduciary duty was that the Herrings' claim was based on
Tante's alleged misuse, to his own advantage, of the confidential
information contained in Mrs. Herring's medical and psychological
reports obtained by him solely as a result of his representation of Mrs.
Tante.1 4 The court noted that Tante's conduct constituted a violation
of Directory Rule 4-401(B)(3),"' which, standing alone, does not create
a private right of action for damages."' The court viewed as merely
incidental the fact that the breach was also an ethical violation." 7 In
fact, the court expressly declined to decide whether violations of the code
are relevant in a claim against a lawyer for legal malpractice or breach
of fiduciary duty."'
Of course, the court decided in Allen that violations of the code may
be admissible as evidence of the standard of care in legal malpractice
actions." 9 Given the language of the Tante decision, it seems safe to
assume that the court would likewise rule that violations of ethical rules
are admissible in cases against lawyers alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
IV. THE ETHICAL PROPRIETY OF FEE ARRANGEMENTS

During the past year, ethics and professionalism have also played
roles in determining the enforceability of fee arrangements with clients
and others. In AFLAC, Inc. v. Williams,20 the question presented was:
"Whether the Court of Appeals opinion with respect to retainer contracts
creates any confusion regarding the ethical conduct expected of an
attorney toward a client."' 2 ' The Georgia Supreme Court concluded
that a liquidated damages clause in a retainer agreement was unenforce-

112. Id.
113. Allen v.Lefkoff, Duncan, Grimes & Dermer, P.C., 265 Ga. 374, 453 S.E.2d 719
(1995).
114.
115.

264 Ga. at 696, 453 S.E.2d at 688.
DR 4-101(B)(3) provides that a lawyer shall not knowingly "use a confidence of

secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third person, unless the client
consents after full disclosure." Id.
116. Davis v. Findley, 262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
117. 264 Ga. at 696 n.5, 453 S.E.2d at 688 n.5.
118. Id.
119, 265 Ga. 374, 453 S.E.2d 719 (1995).
120. AFLAC v. Williams, 264 Ga. 351, 444 S.E.2d 314 (1994).

121. Id. at 352 n.1, 444 S.E.2d at 315 n.1.
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able because it improperly imposed a penalty on the client's implied,
absolute right to terminate its representation by an attorney in private
practice.' 22
In 1987, AFLAC's Chairman and CEO, John Amos, and attorney Peter
Williams agreed on a seven-year retainer under an agreement that
provided (1) monthly payments to Williams and (2) automatic renewal
of the agreement for an additional five years, unless they terminated the
agreement within the seven-year window.123 Williams agreed to work
on an "as needed" basis, and the agreement did not require Williams to
dedicate all of his time to AFLAC. If AFLAC terminated the agreement
at any time other than the end of the seven-year period, even for good
cause, it was required to pay fifty percent of the sums due under the
remaining term, including the renewal term. AFLAC terminated the
agreement in 1991 following Amos' death. It then filed a declaratory
judgment to determine the validity of the contract. By counterclaim,
Williams sought to recover one million dollars from AFLAC under the
termination provision.124

The trial court granted summary judgment to AFLAC on both its
claim and the counterclaim. 12' The court of appeals reversed in part
and held that the original seven-year agreement was valid, but further
the five-year automatic renewal provision was unenforceheld 12that
6
able.

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine
whether a client must pay legal fees to an attorney under a long term
retainer contract after terminating the contract.'27 The court excepted
between employers and infrom consideration employment relationships
12
house counsel or other full-time employees. 1
Reversing the court of appeals, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
"an attorney may not recover damages under a penalty clause when a

122.

Id. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 317.

123. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 315-16. The contract provided as follows:
This agreement will automatically renew on the same terms and conditions
beginning December 31, 1995, for an additional 5 years, unless terminated for just
cause at least ninety (90) days prior to the expiration of the term, in which the
Company will pay you as damages an amount equal to 50 percent of the sums due
under the remaining terms, plus renewal of this agreement.
Id. at 352 n.2, 444 S.E.2d at 315-16 n.2.
124. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 315-16.
125. Id.
126. Williams v. AFLAC, 209 Ga. App. 841,434 S.E.2d 725 (1993), rev'd, 264 Ga. 351,
444 S.E.2d 314 (1994).

127. 264 Ga. at 351, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
128. Id. at 352 n.1, 444 S.E.2d at 315 n.1.
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client exercises the legal right to terminate the attorney's retainer
contract."'29 The court premised its holding on the unique relationship
which exists in the attorney-client contract. 3 ' A necessary corollary
to this particular relationship is the "absolute right to discharge the
attorney and terminate the relationship at any time, even without
cause."131 Since "requiring a client to pay damages eviscerates the
client's absolute right to terminate,"" 2 the court concluded that the
provision requiring AFLAC 33to pay damages equal to half Williams'
retainer was unenforceable.
Thus, the court held that the right to terminate is implied by public
policy in every attorney-client contract because of the peculiar trust
relationship between lawyer and client entitling the client to the
attorney's fidelity."3 In so ruling, the court did not address O.C.G.A.
section 15-19-11,'

which provides as follows:

Unless otherwise stipulated, one-half of the fee in any case is a
retainer and is due at any time unless the attorney, without sufficient
cause, abandons the case before rendering service to that value. In
cases where he has rendered such service but cannot render the
balance of service due to the act of his client, providential cause,
election to office, or removal out of the state, he is entitled to retain
such amount or a due proportion thereof if collected, or if not collected,
to bring an action to collect it. Where no special contract 36is made, the
attorney may recover for the services actually rendered.
Under the statute, Williams would have arguably earned one-half of
the entire contractual amount when he agreed to be retained by AFLAC
as its lawyer, absent any agreement to the contrary, unless he subsequently withdrew without justification. Moreover in McNulty, George &
Hall v. Pruden,'37 the court stated that "when the attorney dedicates

129. Id. at 352, 444 S.E.2d at 315.
130. Id. at 353, 444 S.E.2d at 316.
131. Id.
132. Id., 444 S.E.2d at 317.
133. Id. at 353-54, 444 S.E.2d at 317.
134. The attorney-client relationship has long been one described as trust. See Ryan
v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 661, 662,409 SE.2d 507, 507 (1991); Freeman v. Bigham, 65 Ga. 580,
589 (1880). This "unique" relationship is "founded in principle upon the elements of trust
and confidence on the part of the client and of undivided loyalty and devotion on the part
of the attorney." Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d 387, 389 (N.Y.
1981).
135. O.C.G.A. § 15-19-11 (1993).
136. Id.
137. McNulty, George & Hall v. Pruden, 62 Ga. 135 (1878).
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off from
himself by contract to his client's service thereby cutting himself138
employment by the adverse party he earns a general retainer."
Also during the past year, in Formal Advisory Opinion No.

9 4 - 1 ,ir9

the State Bar of Georgia addressed the ethical propriety of a non-profit
lawyer referral service collecting a percentage of the fees in cases
referred to participating attorneys by the lawyer referral service.
Standard 26 of Bar Rule 4-102140 provides, in pertinent part, that a
lawyer cannot share legal fees with a nonlawyer."' In addition, under
Standard 13(b),142 a lawyer cannot give anything of value, including
compensation, to anyone for a recommendation of the lawyer to a client
that results in employment.1 4 1 Instead, the lawyer may only pay the
customary fees associated with membership in the service.'" The
supreme court reasoned that, although the membership of the local bar
association is composed exclusively of licensed lawyers, the local bar

138. Id. at 141.
139. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 95-H, Formal Op. 94-1 (1994).
140. HANDBOOK, supra note 1, at 42-H. Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 26 provides as
follows:
A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(a) an agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or associate may provide
for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after his death, to his
estate or to one or more specified persons.
(b) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased
lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total
compensation which fairly represents the services rendered by the deceased
lawyer.
(c) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan,
even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit sharing agreement.
A violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at Standard 13(b) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client, or as a reward for having
made a recommendation resulting in his employment by a client; except that he
may pay for public communications permitted by Standard 5 and the usual and
reasonable fees or dues charged by a bona fide lawyer referral service operated by
an organization authorized by law and qualified to do business in this state;
provided, however, such organization has filed with the State Disciplinary Board,
at least annually, a report showing its terms, its subscription charges, agreements
with counsel, the number of lawyers participating, and the names and addresses
of lawyers participating in the service.
A violation of this standard may be punished by disbarment.
Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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association, in and of itself, is not authorized to practice law.1 " As a
result, a lawyer may not split fees or pay a commission to a lawyer
referral service for cases referred to him or her.
V. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS APPLICABLE TO CLIENT FUNDS

From time to time, cases arise in which lawyers become uncertain as
to who is entitled to disputed funds held by the lawyer. During the past
year, the Georgia Supreme Court has issued some guidance in this
situation with Formal Advisory Opinion No. 94-2.148 In every case, the
lawyer has a duty to represent the client's interests. Standard 45147
provides in pertinent part, that in the representation of a client, a
lawyer shall not settle a legal proceeding or claim without obtaining
proper authorization from the client. 14 In those cases where it is
impossible to ascertain who is entitled to the disputed funds, the lawyer
may hold the funds in a trust account for a reasonable time while
attempting to resolve the dispute. 49 If no resolution can be reached,
the lawyer
should interplead the funds into a court of competent jurisdic150
tion.

VI.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION

During the past year, the federal courts appear to have opened the
door for broader solicitation of clients by attorneys. In Speer v.
Miller,"' a Georgia attorney filed suit against the Governor and the
Attorney General of Georgia seeking a permanent injunction against the
enforcement of O.C.G.A. section 35-1-9,"' which makes it unlawful for

145. Formal Op. 94-1 (1994).
146. Formal Op. 94-2 (1994).
147. Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 45(f).
148. Formal Op. 94-2 (1994).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Speer v. Miller, 864 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
152. O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9 (1993) provides as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person to inspect or copy any records of a law
enforcement agency to which the public has a right of access under paragraph (4)
of subsection (a) of Code Section 50-18-72 for the purpose of obtaining the names
and addresses of the victims of crimes or persons charged with crimes or persons
involved in motor vehicle accidents or other information contained in such records
for any commercial solicitation of such individuals or relatives of such individuals.
(b) The provisions of subsection (a) of this Code section shall not prohibit the
publication of such information by any news media or the use of such information

for any other lawful data collection or analysis purpose.
(c) Any person who violates any provision of subsection (a) of this Code section
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
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any person to inspect or copy public law enforcement records for the
purpose of obtaining names and addresses of persons charged with
crimes3 or involved in motor vehicle accidents for commercial solicita5
tion. 1
Initially, the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state
a claim.1" 4 The Eleventh Circuit vacated the order.155 On remand,
the Georgia defendants argued that the state had a substantial interest
in protecting the privacy of those charged with criminal offenses and
those involved in accidents, protecting the public against unnecessary
insurance abuses, and minimizing the opportunity for fraud and
However, the
The district court agreed. 5
misrepresentation.15 6
district court did not agree that the state had a substantial interest in
protecting the privacy of the individuals whose names appeared on the
records at issue, because O.C.G.A. section 35-1-9 did not specifically
prohibit the publication of the names and addresses by the news media
or the use of such information for any other lawful data collection or
analysis purpose.15 According to the court, the law only prohibited the
use of the names and addresses for commercial solicitation. 159 The
district court then determined that O.C.G.A. section 35-1-9 restricted
commercial speech under the First Amendment by punishing the access
of government records when it was coupled with a certain type of
speech. 6 ' The district court opined that the statute's exceedingly
narrow scope denied access only to those intending to use the names
and addresses to solicit people or their relatives for commercial purposes,
making the statute one designed to prevent solicitous practices.161
the statute violated First Amendment
Therefore, the court held that
62
rights to commercial speech.1

Id.
153.

864 F. Supp. 1294.

154. Speer v. Miller, No.92-1094, slip op. at 8 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 1992).
155. Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007 (11th Cir. 1994).
156, Speer, 864 F. Supp. at 1300,
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1302.
159. Id.
160. Id. The Tenth Circuit recently concluded that a statute similar to O.C.G.A. § 35-19 (1993) implicated the First Amendment. Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508
(10th Cir. 1994).
161. Id. The district court used the test established in Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980), to determine that the statute's
restriction on commercial speech violated the First Amendment. 864 F. Supp. at 1299.
162. Speer, 864 F. Supp. at 1301.
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ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN CONTACTING FORMER EMPLOYEES
OF ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL

Standard 4763 mandates that a lawyer shall not communicate about
the subject of representation with a person represented by another
lawyer without the prior consent of that lawyer.'" The Standard is
based on the belief that a lawyer, in order to serve their own selfinterest, should not be able to contact and attempt to manipulate the
clients of other lawyers.""5
This rationale is reflected in Formal
Advisory Opinion No. 87-6,166 which states that it is unethical for an
attorney to interview a current employee of a corporation which is an
opposing party in pending litigation without the consent of the corporation or its counsel if the employee is either (1) a director or officer of the
corporation with the authority to bind the corporation or (2) an employee
whose acts may be imputed to the corporation. 167 However, the
opinion did not address the situation where an attorney seeks to
interview a former employee of the organization represented by counsel
to obtain information relevant to litigation against the organization.
During the past year, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed this
issue.161
In Formal Advisory Opinion No. 94-3,19 the court stated that a
lawyer may properly contact and interview former employees of an
organization that is [or is not] represented by counsel to obtain
nonprivileged information relevant to litigation against the organization
subject to two conditions.170 First, the identity of the lawyer's client
must be fully disclosed. 171 Full disclosure includes notifying the former
employee of the reason for the contact and the purpose of the interview
and telling the former employee any other information necessary under
the circumstances so the interview is not misleading. 72 Second, the
former employee must consent. 17' A refusal of the former employee to
grant the interview means that the lawyer must resort to the normal

163.

GA. RULES OF CT. ANN., Bar Rule 4-102, Standard 47.

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Formal Op. 87-6 (1987).
167. Id.
168. Formal Op. 94-3 (1994).

169. Id.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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discovery process and witness procedures.'74 Therefore, a lawyer may
contact a former employee of an organization for an interview, but,
make full
before proceeding with the interview, the lawyer must
17
disclosure and obtain the consent of the former employee.
VIII.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

During the past year, the appellate courts have attempted to further
define what will and will not toll the statute of limitations in a legal
malpractice action. In Georgia it has long been held that the applicable
statute of limitations for a legal malpractice cause of action based upon
a breach of a duty imposed by the attorney-client contract of employment
176
is four years for an oral contract and six years for a written contract.
Prior to 1990, it was clear that the statute of limitations for a legal
malpractice action based on breach of contract ran from the date of the
breach as opposed to the date that any resulting injury was ascertained.177 In 1990, the Georgia Court of Appeals created an exception
to that rule.
In Arnall, Golden & Gregory v. Health Service Centers, Inc. ,178 the
plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against the defendant
attorneys alleging negligence in the drafting of agreements involving a
nursing home. In prior litigation between the parties concerning the
meaning of certain documents, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted an
interpretation of the documents at issue which was adverse to the
plaintiff. Subsequent to the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling, the
plaintiff brought an action against the defendant attorneys alleging legal
malpractice in drafting the documents. 179 The defendant attorneys
contended*that the statute of limitations had expired and, as a result,
moved to dismiss the complaint. Almost nine years had passed between
the drafting and execution of the documents and the commencement of
the malpractice action."8 0
Initially, the court held that the legal malpractice claim was subject
The court also held that the
to a four-year statute of limitations,'

174. Id.

175. Id.
176. See generally O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 (1982); Riser v. Livsey, 138 Ga. App. 615, 227
S.E.2d 88 (1976).
177. See generally Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 273 S.E.2d 16
(1980); Frates v. Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, 164 Ga. App. 243, 296 S.E.2d 688 (1982);
Riser v. Livsey, 138 Ga. App. 615, 227 S.E.2d 88 (1976).
178. 197 Ga. App. 791, 399 S.E.2d 565 (1990).
179. Id. at 791, 399 S.E.2d at 565.
180. Id., 399 S.E.2d at 565-66.
181. Id. at 792, 399 S.E.2d at 567.
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breach occurred on the date of the documents' execution."8 2 Thus,
3
unless tolled, the statute of limitations began to run on that date. '
Citing Riddle v. Driebe,'M the defendant attorneys contended that
the plaintiff did not allege fraud with the sufficiency necessary to toll the
statute of limitations." In Riddle, the court of appeals held that an
attorney's statements that the documents he prepared for the plaintiff
were legally sufficient were not actionable as actual fraud or designed
to deter or prevent a client from filing a suit, and therefore were not
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations."
In distinguishing Riddle, the court of appeals in Health Service
Centers noted that a confidential relationship between the parties
lessens, if not negates, the necessity for showing actual fraud for
purposes of tolling the statute of limitations.8 7 In applying this ruling
to the case before it, the court noted that the defendant attorneys had
provided several assurances to the plaintiff regarding the documents in
question."'s In fact, according to the court of appeals, the defendant
attorneys continued to represent the plaintiff throughout the appeal in
the case seeking a determination of the correct interpretation of the
documents."19

Based on these facts, the court held that there were questions of fact
requiring jury resolution concerning the impact of the defendant
attorneys' representations about the documents on the statute of
limitations.'
Essentially, the court held that, based on the confidential relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant attorneys, an
issue of fact remained as to whether the statute of limitations had been
tolled by the representations and conduct of the attorneys. 91 For
purposes of the case before it, and apparently other cases involving
attorneys who continue representing their clients after a potential claim
for malpractice exists, the court adopted the following rule previously
enunciated in Sutlive v. Hackney:'92 "Where a person sustains towards
(another) a relation of trust and confidence, his silence when he should

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
153 Ga. App. 276, 265 S.E.2d 92 (1980).
Health Serv. Ctrs., 197 Ga. App. at 792, 399 S.E.2d at 567.
Riddle, 153 Ga. App. 281, 265 S.E.2d 92.
Health Serv. Ctrs., 197 Ga. App. at 792, 399 S.E.2d at 567.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 793, 399 S.E.2d at 568.
Id. at 792-93, 399 S.E.2d at 567-68.
164 Ga. App. 740, 297 S.E.2d 515 (1982).
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speak, or his failure to disclose what he ought to disclose, is193as much a
fraud in law as an actual affirmative false representation."
Although not specifically referring to it, the opinion in this case
appears to adopt a modified form of the doctrine of continuing representation which a number of other states have adopted."94 Under the
doctrine of continuing representation, the statute of limitations is tolled
so long as a position of trust and confidence exists between the attorney
and the client. The only exception is when the attorney specifically
advises a client of the potential malpractice or the client is aware of the
potential malpractice.
This theory for tolling the statute of limitations significantly increases
an attorney's exposure. For example, in Riser v. Livsey,195 the sole lifeincome beneficiary under a trust established by a last will and testament
brought an action for legal malpractice against the attorney who drafted
The action alleged that the attorney was negligent in
the will. 1
drafting the will and advising the decedent. The will was drafted and
executed on March 10, 1970. The suit was filed on September 7,
1974. 17 The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the
defendant attorney based on the four-year statute of limitations and the
court of appeals affirmed."'8 Under Health Service Centers, however,
if the attorney continued representing the decedent up to and including
his death and made representations regarding the validity and effect of
documents, it appears that the statute of limitations could have been
tolled.
In Findley v. Davis, ' the court addressed the statute of limitations
in a different context. In Findley the appellee attorney initially served
as legal counsel and executor to the appellant's mother. Subsequently,
the appellant hired the attorney for legal services in connection with the
sale of commercial property, services much like those the attorney had
provided for the appellant's mother in a previous transaction. In

193.

197 Ga. App. at 793,399 S.E.2d at 567 (quoting Sutlive v. Hackney, 164 Ga. App.

740, 742, 297 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1982)).

194. The doctrine of continuing representation has been adopted in Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Nebraska, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas and
Virginia. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 18.12 (3d
ed. 1989).
195. 138 Ga. App. 615, 227 S.E.2d 88 (1976).
196. Id. at 615, 227 S.E.2d at 88.
197. Id., 227 S.E.2d at 89.
198. Id.
199. 202 Ga. App. 332,414 S.E.2d 317 (1991), rev'd on other grounds, Davis v. Findley,
262 Ga. 612, 422 S.E.2d 859 (1992).
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addition, following the development of a personal relationship, the
appellant loaned the attorney money under a loan agreement prepared
by another attorney. When their personal relationship became strained,
the appellant sued the attorney for legal malpractice, fraud, breach of
fiduciary duty, and conflict of interest in connection with the personal
loan and the two real estate transactions. 2°3 The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the attorney. 0 1
The attorney asserted the statute of limitations as a defense. The
appellant claimed that the malpractice action was not time barred by the
four-year statute of limitations, because the attorney concealed the
unreasonableness of the fees charged, and because fraud tolled the
statute of limitations until the appellant actually discovered the
concealment just prior to filing the complaint.2 2 In rejecting these
arguments, the court of appeals found that the appellant did not show
that any act of the attorney prevented or deterred him from discovering
the reasonableness of the fees.2 3 In fact, according to the court, there
was no indication that the appellant would not have discovered that fact°4
at the time the documents were executed if he had chosen to do so.2
Moreover, the court noted that the attorney made no representations or
assurances with regard to the reasonableness of the fees.20 5 Thus, the
court found no fraud, and the claims with respect to the fees on the first
transaction were time barred.0 6 However, the court did note that, had
the fraud risen to the level of preventing or deterring the client from
discovering the alleged negligence or from bringing20 7the malpractice
action, it might have tolled the statute of limitations.

Likewise, in Hyman v. Jordan, °8 the appellant hired an attorney to

represent him in a breach of contract suit. 20 9 The attorneys., father,

who practiced law with his son, executed a dismissal with prejudice of
two of the defendants in the lawsuit without authorization from his son
or the client. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant attorneys because the four-year statute of limitations had
expired. 210 The court of appeals held that any fraudulent concealment
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by the attorneys was not the type of fraud that would toll the statute of
limitations, since the plaintiff did not show that any act of the defendants prevented or deterred him from discovering their alleged
negligence or from bringing his malpractice action.211
In Foster v. Cohen,212 a criminal defendant alleged that the defense
attorney who represented him at the time he entered his guilty plea was
negligent in not realizing and informing him of the effect that an
amended statute regarding drug offenses would have on the outcome of
his trafficking case.2"' The former client filed the legal malpractice
action seven days after the four-year statute of limitations had expired.
However, the client claimed that the statute of limitations was tolled,
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 9-3-90,214 as a result of his alleged mental

incapacity. The client claimed that he was mentally incapacitated by
neurosis, psychosis, and chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia for which
he was treated with thorazine and, therefore, was incompetent to
manage his affairs for approximately three and one-half years following
his arrest.21
However, the court of appeals noted that the trial judge took the
constitutionally and statutorily required measures to insure that the
client was sufficiently competent to enter a valid plea.21 6 Moreover,
the client admitted that he was not taking medication at the time the
plea was tendered. 7 Because the client held himself out to both his
counsel and to the court as being competent and represented that he had
the mental capacity to enter his plea, the court held that the client was
estopped from claiming mental incapacity pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 9-3-90.218 As a result, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's -granting of the attorney's motion to dismiss.21 9
In Long v. Wallace,"2 a criminal defendant sued his attorney for
malpractice following the defendant's conviction on statutory rape
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charges.2 2' The defendant retained the attorney on February 18, 1986
to represent him in the felony prosecution. Following a trial, a jury
returned a guilty verdict on November 20, 1986.222 The appellate court
affirmed the conviction on November 2, 1988.223 The attorney continued to represent the defendant throughout the appellate process.
Proceeding pro se, the defendant obtained relief by way of habeas corpus
on February 9, 1991, predicated upon an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. The habeas court found that the attorney failed to interview key
witnesses and failed to object or seek corrective action to prevent
coaching of the victim's testimony.2"4
In the malpractice action, the court held that the plaintiff's cause of
action accrued, and the statute of limitations began to run, when the
attorney committed the unskillful acts during the trial in November
1986.225 Accordingly, the trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of the attorney on the ground that the action was time barred.226
The plaintiff contended that the attorney committed separate
subsequent acts of malpractice after the trial and during his representation by failing to urge the attorney's own ineffective assistance as a basis
227
for a new trial on direct appeal or in a petition for habeas corpus.
In rejecting this contention, the court of appeals found that the
allegations of malpractice based upon the subsequent acts were, in fact,
based upon the same errors and omissions arising out of the conduct
during the original trial.228 According to the court, in essence, the
plaintiff's contention consisted of nothing more than the attorney's
failure to correct earlier actions which damaged his client. 229 The
court held that the failure to correct earlier malpractice did not
constitute a separate breach for which the client had a cause of
action.23
Thus, citing Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee,23' the
court held that the failure of the defendant attorney to argue on appeal
his own possible ineffective assistance rendered during trial was not a
separate act of malpractice for purposes of the statute of limitations.2 2
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Finally, in Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue v. American Envirecycle,
Inc.,23 the law firm appellant argued that the plaintiff's underlying
malpractice action based upon the negligent drafting of a sales contract
was untimely. The law firm completed the drafting of the contract on
April 17, 1989. On its face, the contract reflected that the parties
executed it on April 24, 1989. The plaintiff filed the legal malpractice
action on April 26, 1993."' The court analyzed the issue of when legal
malpractice is alleged to arise from the negligent drafting of a contractual document.23 5 The law firm contended that the four-year statute of
limitations should commence when the drafting of the contract was
asserted to have been completed and not when the execution of the
contract occurred.236 The Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed."
The court held that the controlling date giving rise to a cause of action
for malpractice and commencing the running of the statute of limitations
is the date of contract execution. 3 8

233. 217 Ga. App. 80, 456 S.E.2d 264 (1995).
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Monday, April 26, 1993 to file suit.
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